Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right To Change One’s Mind by Shapo, Helene S.
SHAPO_FMT.DOC 01/24/02 9:42 AM
75
FROZEN PRE-EMBRYOS AND THE RIGHT
 TO CHANGE ONE’S MIND
HELENE S. SHAPO*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Biological technology used for purposes of human reproduction
has generated a number of issues involving contract law, genetic par-
enthood, and public policy.  One such issue arises from disagreements
about the fate of frozen embryos.  This issue presents special chal-
lenges to the judicial process even though historically courts have had
experience in applying reason to the most emotional of issues.
In recent decades, new methods of assisted reproduction using
medical technology have enabled infertile couples to have a child who
is biologically related to at least one parent.  These technologies have
also enabled individuals in same sex relationships and unmarried in-
dividuals to bear and raise children.  Often labeled assisted reproduc-
tive technologies (ART), these techniques have become common-
place in modern, technologically sophisticated countries such as the
United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom.
Disputes arising from the use of ART may involve couples or
even three or more contestants.  Among the ARTs that involve third
parties are those utilizing artificial insemination of both married and
unmarried women, sperm donation, and in vitro fertilization (IVF)
involving egg or embryo donation.  These techniques have required
courts and legislatures to redefine the parent-child relationship—a
task that becomes even more difficult when a child is brought into the
world by a surrogate.1  In the United States, most states have been
slow to adopt legislation to resolve these issues; many states still have
nothing more than their version of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act,
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1. See generally Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of
Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091 (1997).
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which includes only one section relevant to this issue: Section 5, on
artificial insemination by donor (AID).2
This Article discusses the use of IVF by a husband and wife.
This process involves the surgical removal of eggs from the wife and
the in vitro fertilization of those eggs with the husband’s sperm.  Al-
though this topic does not involve third parties to the conception of a
child, like those attending uses of ART mentioned above, the legal
issues involved are no less complex.  Because IVF procedures may
produce more fertilized eggs than can be implanted safely for gesta-
tion, a couple may leave unused pre-embryos3 at the IVF clinic to be
frozen and stored.  It has been estimated that tens of thousands of
pre-embryos are frozen each year.4  This Article focuses on the legal
issues that arise if the couple later divorces and one of them requests
custody of the frozen pre-embryos, usually for future implantation ei-
ther in the wife or in a surrogate, while the other wants them de-
stroyed.5
These problems loom large for the couples involved, but the case
law is also interesting for what it tells us about the importance of par-
enthood in the post-IVF world.  In the United States, pre-embryo
custody disputes have resulted in at least five reported cases in which
courts have awarded the pre-embryos to the party opposing implanta-
tion.6  In doing so, the courts stopped the process the parties began
2. Uniform Parentage Act § 5, 9 B.U.L.A. 296 (1987).
3. The cases treating this topic identify the early-developed fertilized egg in different
ways; some courts, for example, use the terms zygote or pre-zygote.  See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (“pre-zygotes”).  Other courts use the term pre-embryo.  See, e.g., Li-
towitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. App. 2000) (“pre-embryos”); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d
1051 (Mass. 2000) (“pre-embryos”); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(“pre-embryos”), aff’d in part and modified in part, 2001 WL 909294 (N.J. Aug. 14, 2001) (“pre-
embryos”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (“pre-embryos”); see also Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 742.17 (1997) (“pre-embryos”).  I will use pre-embryo.  For a discussion of the use of the
various terms, see J.B., 751 A.2d at 615, n.1.
4. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 289 (1998) [hereinafter ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES].
5. Because the courts are reluctant to classify frozen pre-embryos as property, they have
not applied joint tenancy or tenancy in common analysis to the issue of their ownership.  In-
stead, the courts have labeled pre-embryos as a separate category, neither person nor property,
that deserves special respect because of its potential to develop into a person.  See Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 597.  Courts have not delineated the consequences of that label, although in Hecht v.
Superior Court, the court’s decision that a decedent’s frozen sperm were a separate category of
property allowed a probate court to assume jurisdiction over the sperm as property of the dece-
dent.  20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. 1993).
6. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000), aff’d in part, 2001 WL 909294 (N.J. Aug. 14, 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d
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when they decided to create a new life.  U.S. courts, however, have
disagreed as to the reasons for their decisions and some of these
courts have relied on questionable analogies that will be discussed
later in this Article.  In contrast, in Nachmani v. Nachmani,7 the Is-
raeli Supreme Court in 1996 awarded a couple’s frozen pre-embryos
to the wife, Ms. Nachmani, who was childless, so that she could at-
tempt to implant the frozen pre-embryos in a surrogate.  Control over
the pre-embryos was Ms. Nachmani’s sole means of fulfilling her de-
sire to become a mother to a biologically related child, as she could
no longer produce eggs.8
Current United States case law offers some support for the view
that where the couple’s frozen pre-embryos represent the last chance
for one party to become a biological parent, the court should award
the pre-embryos to that person.9  In the United Kingdom, the com-
prehensive Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA)10 re-
quires that the couple, at the time of IVF treatments, agree to the dis-
position of their frozen pre-embryos.  Both parties must consent to
any change in that agreement.  Furthermore, under the HFEA, the
pre-embryos will be destroyed after a statutory time period.11  The re-
cently enacted Human Rights Act,12 however, must now be taken into
account in interpreting the HFEA and may complicate the law in the
United Kingdom.
II.  NACHMANI V. NACHMANI
In Nachmani v. Nachmani, a childless Israeli couple agreed to
undergo IVF and then to contract with a surrogate in California to
bear their child, because the wife could neither gestate nor carry the
fetus to term.13  The couple did not sign an agreement with the IVF
clinic regarding disposition of the embryos, although they did sign a
174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1991); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086
(Wash. 2000).
7. 50(4) P.D. 661 (Isr.) [hereinafter Nachmani II].
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., J.B., 751 A.2d 613; Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
10. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
11. Id.
12. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
13. Discussion of Nachmani II is available in Dalia Dorner, Human Reproduction: Reflec-
tions on the Nachmani Case, 35 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 1 (2000); see also Shulamit Almog, Law Ver-
sus Justice, 11 JUSTICE 35 (1996).
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surrogacy agreement.14  The wife, Ruthi, went through medical treat-
ments to extract eggs, which were the last eggs she could produce.
Eleven eggs were fertilized with her husband’s sperm and frozen for
future implantation.  The couple then separated.  Danni, the husband,
subsequently lived with another woman, and had two children in that
relationship.15
Ruthi requested that the clinic release the frozen pre-embryos to
her so that she could arrange for a surrogate mother, but Danni op-
posed the request and the clinic refused to release the pre-embryos.
Ruthi then initiated litigation to obtain them.16  She was successful in
the district court where the judge, seeming reproachful of Danni, held
that he had breached his contract with his wife.17  Like a husband
whose wife becomes pregnant from intercourse, the judge ruled,
Danni could not withdraw his agreement to have a child once the fer-
tilization had gone forward.18
A five-judge panel of the Supreme Court of Israel reversed the
trial court, upholding Danni’s fundamental right not to be forced to
be a parent.19  The court stated that just as it could not force parent-
hood on a woman, it could not force it upon a man when the couple
had used technology.  The couple’s agreement was unenforceable be-
cause its performance as originally contemplated was impossible.  Un-
til the embryos were implanted, the couple’s joint agreement was re-
quired at every stage.20
14. Surrogacy was legalized in Israel with the 1996 Surrogate Motherhood Agreements
(Approval of Agreement and Status of Newborn) Law 5756-1996, 1996 S.H. 1577, 176 (English
translation on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).  The Surro-
gate Motherhood Agreements permits only gestational surrogacy; that is surrogacy in which the
surrogate has no genetic connection with the child, but is impregnated with a pre-embryo con-
ceived by IVF.  The law provides administrative regulation of the surrogacy process.  See Ruth
Halpern-Kaddari, Redefining Parenthood, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 313, 318–21 (1999) (for a de-
scription of the law’s provisions).
15. See Almog, supra note 13, at 36.
16. Unlike the couples’ status in the American cases, the Nachmanis were not divorced at
the time of the litigation.
17. Janie Chen, Note, The Right to Her Embryos: An Analysis of Nachmani v. Nachmani
and its Impact on Israeli In Vitro Fertilization Law, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 329
(1999).  An English translation of the Nachmani decisions has not been available, and thus, my
analysis of these decisions is based on quotations in the preceding article.  My analysis also
draws upon Dorner, supra note 13; and Almog, supra note 13, at 39.
18. Evelyn Gordon, Court: Fatherhood Cannot be Forced, THE JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 31,
1995, at 20; SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS 66 (2000); see also Chen, supra note
17, at 329.
19. Nachmani v. Nachmani, 49(1) P.D. 485 (Isr.) [hereinafter Nachmani I]; see Chen, supra
note 17, at 330; KAHN, supra note 18, at 66.
20. Chen, supra note 17, at 334.
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The Supreme Court reheard the case as a panel of eleven justices
and, in a 7-4 decision, reversed the five-justice panel and awarded the
fertilized eggs to Ruthi.21  Each justice wrote a separate decision.  The
majority viewed this case as one to which no statutes or precedents
applied, and looked primarily to principles of justice and morality,
and to the paramount value of life, rather than to contract law.22
Some of the majority justices stressed that successful implantation of
the fertilized eggs was Ruthi’s only chance to become a mother of
biologically-related children.23  According to one of the justices, the
majority relied on a number of concepts including a balancing analy-
sis, an “absolute approach to justice,”24 requiring a decision in favor of
creating life, and an understanding of justice as “that which does the
least harm,”25 requiring a decision in favor of Ruthi because the harm
of denying her a chance of parenthood would be greater than the
harm to Danni.26  The balancing analysis took account of all of the
relevant circumstances of the case, comparing the parties’ good faith
defense of their rights, the point at which Danni decided to contest
Ruthi’s access to the pre-embryos, Ruthi’s reliance on Danni’s repre-
sentations, and her lack of available alternatives to achieve genetic
parenthood.27  The justices decided that the harm to Ruthi in denying
her the chance to be a biological mother was greater than the harm to
Danni of becoming a parent against his wishes.28
Three of the justices in the minority would not have held Danni
to the original oral agreement.29  They interpreted the agreement as
one the couple intended to fulfil as an intact family rather than one
that could be enforced against Danni after he separated from his wife
and began a new family.30  According to these justices, Ruthi could
not have relied on the agreement because she knew the pitfalls along
the way from conception to birth, and knew that her husband’s con-
sent would be required at every step, as with the surrogacy arrange-
21. Nachmani II, 50(4) P.D. 661 (Isr.).
22. Rhona Schuz, Israel, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 1996, at 237,
251 (1998).  The majority justices did invoke estoppel principles.  Id. at 252–54; see also Dorner,
supra note 13, at 3 n.8; Chen, supra note 17, at 347.
23. Dorner, supra note 13, at 8.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 7–8.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id.; see also Chen, supra note 17, at 342; KAHN, supra note 18, at 68.
29. Dorner, supra note 13, at 3.
30. Id.
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ment.31  The fourth dissenting justice, reaching a conclusion similar to
that reached in some American cases, also would have required
Danni’s consent in order to impose the obligations of parenthood on
him.32  Approaching the issue as a matter of rights, this justice deter-
mined that Ruthi’s right to pursue parenthood did not encompass the
right to be a parent to a child conceived from Danni’s sperm.33
In the Nachmani decisions, the Israeli courts raised many of the
same issues that have emerged in the American cases deciding the
fate of frozen pre-embryos conceived in vitro by a couple who later
divorces.34  Both Israeli and American courts have concerned them-
selves with whether a court should enforce a couple’s pre-conception
agreement, whether a person can be forced to be a parent against his
or her wishes, and whether one party’s interest in becoming a parent
outweighs the other party’s interest in not becoming a parent.  The
American cases, however, have all reached opposite results than that
reached in the final Nachmani decision.  Furthermore, taken together,
the American decisions reveal a lack of consensus as to the binding
nature of a couple’s pre-conception contract and the weight of the
parties’ interests in becoming or not becoming parents.
III.  THE AMERICAN CASES
An important difference between the Nachmanis’ contract and
the contracts at issue in the American cases is that in Nachmani the
only contract was the agreement between the couple to undergo IVF
and to engage a surrogate mother.  In the United States, IVF clinics
often require a couple to sign informed consent forms before they be-
gin IVF treatments.35  Included in many of these forms is a section in
which the couple must specify what should be done with their pre-
embryos in a variety of future situations, including divorce.36  The
choices include destroying the pre-embryos, giving them to the clinic
for research, donating them to another couple, and releasing them to
one of the parties.37  In two American cases, the couple who signed
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000), aff’d in part, 2001 WL 909294 (N.J. Aug. 14, 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1991); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086
(Wash. 2000).  See also Dorner, supra note 13, at 5.
35. But see, Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
36. See, e.g., Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174.
37. See id.
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the informed consent contracts chose to relinquish the pre-embryos if
they divorced;38 in one case the consent form would have given the
pre-embryos to the wife.39
A. Decision-Making Authority
One of the early issues that arose in this area of the law was
whether only the couple—that is, the progenitors of the fertilized
egg—should have the decision-making authority to determine the fate
of the pre-embryos, rather than, for example, the IVF clinic or the
couple’s doctor.40  To date, no case law or statute has determined that
the decision should be made by anyone except the progenitors, unless
they cannot agree.
A difficult issue is how that decision should be made.  At present,
many IVF clinics require that a couple indicate their decision on the
clinic’s informed consent form, which is essentially a document ex-
plaining the IVF procedures and its risks.  Professor John Robertson,
whose numerous articles about legal issues involved in reproductive
technologies have been very influential, has characterized the signed
form not only as a consent form and a prior directive to the clinic, but
also as a document that is legally binding between the parties them-
selves, even though the status of the consent form was uncertain and
unlitigated.41  Professor Robertson advocated holding the couple to
their pre-IVF agreement, even in the face of changed circumstances,
in order to maximize their procreative choice by allowing them,
rather than the clinic, to decide the embryo’s fate; to provide “ad-
ministrative convenience and efficiency;”42 and to minimize the costs
of disputes.43
This proposition was supported initially in dictum in Davis v.
Davis44 by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the first U.S. state court to
38. See id.; see also J.B., 751 A.2d 613.
39. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051.
40. See John Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 407 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements].  Professor Robertson has suggested
that it may be unconstitutional to deprive the progenitors of the decision-making authority over
their embryos.  See John Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76
VA. L. REV. 437, 458 (1990).
41. See Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 40, at 410.  Professor Robertson cites no
authority for the suggestion that the clinic’s consent form is binding as between the couple.
42. Id. at 416.
43. Id. at 418.  Professor Robertson, however, would not enforce an agreement that the
wife gestate the child if she later changed her mind.  Id. at 419 n.37.
44. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1991).
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decide the fate of frozen pre-embryos.  In Davis, the parties had no
prior agreement about disposition of the pre-embryos, but the court
stated that if in fact the parties had agreed in the clinic’s form to dis-
pose of the pre-embryos in a certain way, the court would have en-
forced that agreement.45  The court noted, however, that because the
parties’ initial agreement might not be “truly informed,” they should
be able to modify that agreement after they understood the difficul-
ties involved in IVF and implantation, assuming both parties agreed
to the modifications.46  The Davis court awarded the pre-embryos to
the husband based on the facts before it, using a balancing approach
that will be discussed below.47  The court’s dicta, and Professor Rob-
ertson’s article on prior agreements cited above, have attracted ad-
herents in subsequent academic writing and in some case law.48
Although some states have enacted legislation addressing IVF,49
none has provided for custody of the pre-embryos if the couple di-
vorces or cannot agree on a course of action.50  Florida has passed
legislation requiring that the couple and the treating physician “enter
into a written agreement” to provide for the disposition of the cou-
ple’s pre-embryos “in the event of divorce, the death of a spouse, or
any other unforeseen circumstance.”51  If the couple does not have a
written agreement, the couple jointly retains decision-making author-
ity over the pre-embryos.52  The statute does not clarify whether the
contract is binding between the couple themselves, as compared with
its force between the couple and their physician.  Nor does it provide
for the possibility that the couple will not agree concerning the dispo-
sition of the pre-embryos.
45. Id. at 597.
46. Id.
47. See text accompanying notes 130–141.
48. See, e.g., Heidi Forster, The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and De-
struction of Frozen Human Embryos, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 759, 773 (1998); Carl H. Coleman,
Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen
Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 71, 74–75 (1999); Donna Sheinbach, Examining Dis-
putes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen Embryos, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 989, 1000–01 (1999);
Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs—Custody, Control, and Contracts: Allocating Decisional
Authority Over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 949 (1999).  For examples of
case law, see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000) (citing Davis and Robertson); J.B.
v. M.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *7 (N.J. Aug. 14, 2001) (citing Davis); Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d
581, 597–98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (citing Davis and Robertson); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d
1086, 1090 (Wash. 2000) (citing Davis).
49. See, e.g., N.H. § 168-B:13 et seq.; La. § 9:121–9:133; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.102(b).
50. Coleman, supra note 48, at 74–75.
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997).
52. Id. § 742.17(2).
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B. Kass v. Kass: Contractual Enforcement
The only court that has based its decision on the parties’ contract
with the clinic was New York’s highest court in Kass v. Kass.53  The
Kasses were a childless couple who decided to undergo IVF and sur-
rogacy.  The clinic provided the couple with four complex consent
forms, which included addenda.54  Form 1 was comprised of twelve
single-spaced, typed pages explaining the medical procedures the
clinic would use.55  The first addendum to that form required the par-
ties to complete an Additional Consent Form for cryopreservation,
consisting of seven single-spaced pages in two parts.56  The first part
explained that the extra pre-embryos would be frozen and released
only with the consent of both parties.57  In the event of divorce, the
form provided that ownership of the pre-embryos “must be deter-
mined in a property settlement” and released only “by order of a
court of competent jurisdiction.”58  This section concluded with lan-
guage that said that because “the possibility of death or any other un-
foreseen circumstances” could result in a situation in which neither
party would be able to determine the fate of the frozen pre-embryos,
the couple must initial their choice of means of disposal.59  That
choice could be changed only by the couple signing a new statement.
The Kasses initialed the option giving the pre-embryos to the clinic
for research.60
After the unsuccessful implantation of some of the pre-embryos
in a surrogate, the couple decided to divorce.  They drew up and
signed, but never finalized, an agreement affirming that the frozen
pre-embryos would be disposed of by the clinic and that neither party
would claim custody.61  One month later, however, the wife requested
sole custody in order to undergo a second implantation, although her
previous pregnancies had all ended in miscarriages.62  After the par-
ties divorced, the lower court gave custody of the five remaining pre-
53. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 177.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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embryos to the wife.63  The lower court, like the district court in
Nachmani, found no difference between in vitro fertilization and fer-
tilization resulting from coitus (in vivo fertilization) with respect to
the rights of the wife as the exclusive decision-maker.64  The appellate
division, however, reversed that decision.65  The appellate division ini-
tially differentiated in vivo pregnancy and frozen pre-embryos on the
grounds of the pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity, a right not
at issue if the couple’s pre-embryos were still frozen in the clinic.66
Two judges of the court’s 3-2 majority held that the couple’s informed
consent form controlled the disposition of the frozen pre-embryos;
the third said that the consent form was ambiguous, but that the hus-
band’s interest in avoiding procreation was paramount.67
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division
decision,68 agreeing that the couple themselves should determine the
fate of the pre-embryos.  Because the couple had agreed to the man-
ner of disposition in their consent form, the Court of Appeals said
that it would enforce that agreement using general principles of con-
tract interpretation.69  The court agreed with Professor Robertson’s
reasoning that enforcement of advance directives will avoid litigation,
maximize individual procreative liberty, and provide certainty.70
Because the wife had not argued that the consent form was
against public policy or that changed circumstances precluded its en-
forcement,71 the only issue before the Court of Appeals was whether
the consent forms were ambiguous.  Concluding that they were not,
the court found that the forms “unequivocally manifest [the parties’]
mutual intention” that the pre-embryos be donated for research, and
that the couple intended the disposition to be made only by joint de-
63. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
64. Id. at *2.
65. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
66. Id. at 587.
67. Id. at 591–92.
68. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
69. Id. at 180.
70. Id.  The court disagreed with the conclusions in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, a
report of a New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, that an embryo should not be im-
planted or destroyed if one of the progenitors disagrees.  Id. at 179; see also ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4.  For explanation of this view, see Coleman, su-
pra note 48, at 56.  Mr. Coleman advocates an “inalienable rights approach” by which each pro-
genitor has the right to change her mind.  If one progenitor changes her mind and the couple
cannot agree on their embryos’ fate, the embryos would remain in storage, giving the couple
more time to reach agreement.  Id. at 111–12.
71. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 n.4.
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cision.72  The court regarded the parties’ later divorce instrument as a
reaffirmation of their original agreement.73  Thus, the court enforced a
long, technical, difficult-to-read consent form that the couple signed
before the wife embarked on a series of expensive, intrusive, and
painful hormonal treatments, and before the couple knew if they
would produce extra pre-embryos that would be frozen.  The result of
the decision was to allow the clinic to use the couple’s pre-embryos
for research even after one of the progenitors withdrew her consent.74
C. Parenthood by Contract
The final Kass decision, based solely on the couple’s pre-
treatment signed form with the IVF clinic, aligns with the concept of
parenthood by contract adopted by some courts in ART litigation,
and advocated by several academics.75  This approach has been used
to determine a child’s legal parentage in cases in which more than two
parties claim to be parents of a child who is already born or in gesta-
tion.  For example, in a surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate may
change her mind during pregnancy or after giving birth and decide to
keep the child instead of giving the child up for adoption to the cou-
ple who contracted for her gestational services.  Or, in another sce-
nario, a man who donates sperm to an unmarried woman may want to
establish his paternity against the wishes of the woman, who has de-
cided to raise the child on her own.  Some of the people seeking rec-
ognition as the parent may have no biological relation to the child, or
72. Id. at 181.  The court supported this reading by pointing to the frequent use of the plu-
ral first person pronoun, as designating “shared understanding.”  Id.  Of course, the pronouns
were used by the clinic on a preprinted boiler plate form.
73. Id.
74. For criticism of this approach, see George J. Annas, The Shadowlands—Secrets, Lies,
and Assisted Reproduction, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 935, 936–37 (1998).  For criticism of the pro-
cess by which the parties must sign dispositional choices within the clinic’s informed consent
forms, see Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 897 (2000).  Professor Waldman does not disapprove of enforcing contracts that were
“properly conceived and executed.”  Id. at 900.  For an argument in favor of uniform state
regulation of ART, including a nationally uniform consent agreement administered by IVF fa-
cilities, see Jennifer M. Stolier, Comment, Disputing Frozen Embryos: Using International Per-
spectives to Formulate Uniform U.S. Policy, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 459 (2001).
75. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean To Be a “Parent”?  The Claims of Bi-
ology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991); Anne Reichman Schiff,
Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524 (1994);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportu-
nity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1990); Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining
Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE. L.J. 187, 194 (1986) (re-
ferring to a parent as one whose “mental concept” initiated the procreation).
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may not have been married to a person having a biological relation-
ship to the child.
Advocates of parenthood by contract would determine a child’s
legal parentage by enforcing the parties’ private preconception
agreements.  Thus, a child’s parents would be those who brought
about the child’s birth, intending at the time of conception to become
the child’s legal parents.  Advocates of this view aver that the concept
of parenthood by contract encourages the parties to plan and negoti-
ate in advance of pregnancy, and protects the parties’ expectations.76
Two decisions from California courts are the best known cases
following this approach.77  These cases did not involve frozen pre-
embryos.  Rather, the decisions endorsed parenthood by intent in dif-
ficult surrogacy cases where the state’s Parentage Act78 failed to de-
termine the child’s mother. The first of these cases, Johnson v. Cal-
vert,79 involved gestational surrogacy.  A gestational surrogate is a
woman who is not the genetic parent, but is impregnated with a pre-
embryo conceived by IVF from the ova and sperm of a married cou-
ple, and who carries the child to term.80  In Johnson, the surrogate de-
cided to keep the child she carried.81  The court determined that both
the surrogate, as the woman who gave birth to the child, and the wife,
as the genetic parent, qualified as the child’s mother under the Par-
entage Act.82  But, declining to hold that the child had two mothers,
the court held that only the wife was the child’s mother because she
was the woman who had intended originally to be the legal parent.83
She arranged and bargained for the surrogacy, and she originally held
the “mental concept” of the child, all of which entitled her to be rec-
ognized as the child’s parent.84  The court used the surrogacy contract
as evidence of the parties’ intent.85  Thus, the Johnson decision relied
on contract law to determine a child’s parents, and in doing so,
76. See the discussion in Shapo, Matters of Life and Death, supra note 1, at 1182–88.
77. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(1)
(West 1994)).
79. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
80. See id. at 784 (use of that term); see also Shapo, supra note 1, at 1160–61.
81. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
82. Id. at 782.
83. Id. at 783–84.
84. Id. at 782–83; see also Shapo, supra note 1, at 1176–80.  The court took the phrase
“mental concept” from Stumpf, supra note 75, at 194.
85. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
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changed the settled presumption that a child’s mother is the woman
who gives birth.86
In the other California case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, the
court determined that the contracting wife was the mother of a child
conceived by IVF from anonymous sperm and egg donors and im-
planted in a surrogate.87  The child, who was in the custody of the con-
tracting wife, had no known genetic parent and the surrogate did not
claim the child.88  The parenthood issue arose because the couple was
divorcing and the husband contested the wife’s claim for child sup-
port, arguing that the child was not a child of the marriage, a re-
quirement for the court’s jurisdiction to award child support.89  The
lower court held that the child had no parents.90  The appellate court
instead analogized Ms. Buzzanca to a husband who consents to AID,
the artificial insemination procedure in which donor sperm is used.91
Under California’s Parentage Act, the husband is the child’s legal fa-
ther, although not the biological one.92  According to the court’s anal-
ogy to AID, the Buzzancas’ arrangement and consent to the IVF pro-
cedure using a donor’s egg cells and sperm, and to the surrogate’s
impregnation, made them the parents of the resulting child, analo-
gous to the way that a husband who consents to the AID procedure
becomes a parent to the wife’s child.93
Because in Buzzanca the wife became the mother by analogy to
the husband in AID, but the surrogate was the mother under the Par-
entage Act, the court found itself presented with the same situation as
that in Johnson—the child had two mothers under California law.94
The court “broke the tie” in the same way as did the Johnson court; it
held that Ms. Buzzanca was the legal mother because she arranged
86. Criticizing Johnson, see Annas, The Shadowlands, supra note 74, at 937 (“the tradi-
tional rule”); Alexander Morgan Capron, Too Many Parents, 28 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–
Oct. 1998, at 22.
87. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
88. Id. at 282.
89. Id. at 293.
90. Id. at 282 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 288.
92. Id. at 285–86.  In this case, unlike the husband who consents to artificial insemination,
Mr. Buzzanca did not consent to treatment on his wife.  The Buzzancas never consented to the
medical procedures involved in IVF and surrogacy, although they arranged them.  Moreover, in
contrast to a married couple’s situation in AID, neither Mr. nor Ms. Buzzanca was biologically
related to the child.
93. Id. at 288–89.
94. Id. at 288.
SHAPO_FMT.DOC 01/24/02  9:42 AM
88 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:75
the child’s birth, intending to become the legal parent, as demon-
strated by the surrogacy contract.95
In these surrogacy cases, the California courts used the parties’
contract to determine parenthood of a child in situations in which no
statutes or case law settled the dispute, and in which the court was in
the unusual situation of determining who was the mother of an al-
ready born child.  In the first case, two women, both biologically re-
lated to the child, claimed to be the child’s mother; in the other, only
the custodial adult, but no biologically related person, claimed mater-
nity of the child.  Unable to use the tactics of King Solomon, the
courts chose the woman who had contracted to be the mother before
the child was conceived, and who had not changed her mind in the in-
terim.
Although critics question whether it is appropriate to use a con-
tract model to determine a child’s parents,96 the New York Court of
Appeals used that model in Kass for a different purpose.97  In Kass,
the court enforced a contract embodying the parties’ pre-conception
intent in a situation involving only the two progenitors of the fertil-
ized eggs, handing down a decision that prevented a child from being
born.98  The court did not reach the issue of whether, in light of the
changed circumstances, the contract should have been enforced.99
Had the court carried through its reliance on Professor Robertson’s
analysis, however, it would have concluded that the parties had to be
held to their pre-IVF agreement to discard their pre-embryos, even in
the changed circumstances of their divorce, and even given the fact
that the pre-embryos then provided Ms. Kass her only means of hav-
ing a biologically related child.  Professor Robertson has written that
in such a situation, “[t]he risk of unfairness in enforcing embryo
agreements does not override the advantages of legal certainty that
accrues to couples and IVF programs from enforcing these agree-
ments.”100  In addition, according to this view, enforcement of the con-
tract provides another benefit: courts will avoid involvement in bur-
densome litigation requiring them to weigh the parties’ competing
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 86, at 22; Annas, supra note 74; Coleman, supra note 48, at
5670; Esther M. Schonfeld, “To Be or Not To Be a Parent?” The Search for a Solution to Cus-
tody Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 15 TOURO L. REV. 305, 325 (1998).
97. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
98. Id. at 181.
99. Id. at 180 n.4.
100. Robertson, supra note 40, at 420.
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interests.  Enforcement would also encourage the couple to bargain
over potentially divisive issues and clarify their agreement.101
Professor Robertson’s analysis seems to ignore the couple’s in-
tense emotional state at the time the clinic requires them to sign the
consent form.  At that time, rather than bargaining over divorce
terms, the couple is far more likely to concentrate on the information
in the forms explaining the difficulty of the procedures, the consider-
able expense involved, and their chances for success.102  That the cou-
ple would also rationally bargain and evaluate their options regarding
provision for their pre-embryos post divorce seems implausible, and
therefore a tenuous basis on which to enforce the consent form.
Moreover, IVF clinics will not be disadvantaged if the couple’s initial
agreement is not enforced, as long as one party pays to keep the pre-
embryos in storage and the clinic is notified if the couple’s circum-
stances have changed since they signed the IVF consent.103
D. American Cases: Rights-Based Analyses and Balancing
The Kass approach of enforcing the couple’s pre-conception in-
tent and holding them to the terms of the IVF clinic consent form has
not been followed in other jurisdictions.  Instead, other courts have
engaged in the very sort of litigation regarding parenthood that the
New York court sought to avoid.104  These courts, however, also have
reached the result of preventing gestation of embryos conceived by
IVF.105
In the two more recent cases that involved custody of frozen pre-
embryos, the courts found in favor of the party seeking destruction of
the pre-embryos, but not on the basis of the couple’s contract.106  In
one case, the court held that the contract at issue, which would have
given the pre-embryos to the party wishing to bring them to term, was
unenforceable as against public policy.107  To hold otherwise, the court
101. Id.
102. For example, the wife in J.B. v. M.B. stated that “[t]here were never any discussions
between the Defendant [her ex-husband] and I [sic] regarding the disposition of the frozen em-
bryos should our marriage be dissolved.”  2001 WL 909294, at *2. (N.J. Aug. 14, 2001).  Her
statement, however, was disputed by her husband.  Id. at *6.
103. See Coleman, supra note 48, at 111.
104. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
105. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Tenn. 1991).
106. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); J.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *11.  These
cases date from 2000 and 2001, respectively.
107. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057–58.
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decided, would amount to judicially enforced procreation.108  In an-
other recent decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that it
would enforce an unambiguous agreement entered into at the time of
the IVF treatments, but only if neither party had changed his or her
mind.109  A change of mind by either party would require notification
in writing to the clinic.110  In both cases, the divorced couple already
had children during the marriage.
In the Massachusetts case of A.Z. v. B.Z.,111 the couple had
signed a series of consent forms with a clinic. After the husband
signed the consent form, the wife wrote in additional language stating
that the embryos would be given to her for implantation if the couple
“should become separated.”112  Disagreeing with the New York court
in Kass, the A.Z. court first determined that the consent form was in-
tended to control only the relationship between the couple and the
clinic, but not intended to be a binding agreement between the cou-
ple.113  Moreover, the court said that even if it enforced the terms of
the consent form, the outcome dictated by the consent form would
apply only if the parties separated and not if they divorced.114  The
court added that even if the form applied, it could not conclude that
the husband had consented to its terms because he had signed before
the wife’s language was added.115
The court concluded that even if the consent forms could be con-
strued to apply to the situation, the court would not have enforced
them because to do so would violate the public policy of the state.116
The court did not balance the couple’s competing interests, but in-
stead analyzed Massachusetts’s policy of distinguishing between
agreements concerning family relationships, which implicate an indi-
vidual’s liberty and privacy, and other contracts.117  The court inter-
preted the policy basis of Massachusetts law to suggest that an indi-
vidual may reconsider the terms of intra-family agreements and will
108. Id.
109. J.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *9.
110. Id.
111. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054.
112. Id. at 1054.
113. Id. at 1056; cf. Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d 465, 468 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (holding that
frozen pre-embryos were not subject to the jurisdiction of a divorce court because they were not
property and said that the issue was to be determined between the clinic and the couple).
114. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1057, 1058.
117. Id. at 1058–59.
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not be bound by prior consent to enter into unwanted future family
relationships: “Prior agreements to enter familial relationships (mar-
riage or parenthood) should not be enforced against individuals who
subsequently reconsider their decisions.”118  The A.Z. court analo-
gized to a type of agreement involving the birth of children: surrogacy
agreements to give up the child for adoption to the commissioning
couple.119 A Massachusetts statute provides that a parent cannot ir-
revocably consent to give a child for adoption until four days after the
child’s birth.120  As to surrogacy, a Massachusetts court had held that
the policy behind the adoption statute applied and that a surrogacy
agreement could not be enforced unless it granted the surrogate a
waiting period in which to change her mind.121
Neither of these examples is directly analogous to the custody of
frozen pre-embryos.  They are examples of the law protecting bio-
logical parents who want to keep their child.  Also, like the California
surrogacy cases, they involve a decision to recognize parentage where
more than two claimants seek recognition of their status as parents of
a child who has already been born.  The choice involving frozen em-
bryos is not that of determining the child’s parent, but a choice be-
tween the child being born to a particular person or the child’s non-
existence.122  Moreover, the court’s analogies highlight the importance
the law has placed on protecting biological parents’ rights to change
their minds in order to keep their child.
In the New Jersey case of J.B. v. M.B., the court also ordered the
destruction of the couple’s frozen pre-embryos.123  The ex-wife wanted
the frozen pre-embryos destroyed or used for research. The ex-
husband wanted to donate them to another couple or to keep them
frozen to use with a future spouse.  The clinic’s consent form specified
that if the parties divorced, their pre-embryos would be relinquished
to the clinic, unless a court ordered otherwise.  The ex-husband al-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1059.
120. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, §2 (Law. Co-op. 1981).
121. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998).  The surrogate was also the genetic
mother of the child, which was conceived by AID.  Id. at 791.  The court also held that a surro-
gacy agreement is not enforceable if it provides for payment to the surrogate beyond pregnancy-
related expenses.  Id. at 797.
122. Cf. J.K. MASON, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF REPRODUCTION AND PARENTHOOD
219 (2d ed. 1998) (distinguishing AID from adoption).
123. 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).  At the time of this writing, this case was
just decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  J.B. v. M.B., 2001 WL 909294 (N.J. Aug. 14,
2001).
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leged, however, that the parties had agreed that the unused pre-
embryos would be held and donated to another couple.  The appel-
late court agreed with the ruling in A.Z. v. B.Z. that a contract to pro-
create was against public policy.124  The New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the appellate court’s decision and concluded that, like other
agreements that involved entering into or terminating family rela-
tions, this contract should not be enforced against a now unwilling
party.125  However, both the appellate and supreme courts engaged in
balancing the couple’s interests and decided that the burden on the
ex-wife in becoming a parent outweighed the burden on the ex-
husband if the pre-embryos were destroyed.126  An important basis for
each court’s decision was that the ex-husband was not unable to fa-
ther a child with another woman,127 and indeed was already a father.128
This type of balancing analysis was first employed by a court in Davis
v. Davis, the first case involving a divorced couple’s dispute over cus-
tody of their frozen pre-embryos.129
As noted above,130 in Davis, the couple had no prior agreement
concerning disposition of their pre-embryos.  The Tennessee court
decided in favor of the ex-husband, Junior Davis, who wanted the
pre-embryos destroyed.  The court based its analysis on the parties’
right to procreational autonomy131 that it derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s constitutional right to privacy132 and the Tennessee
constitution.133  The court viewed procreational autonomy as including
both the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.134  Al-
though state action is seemingly not involved in these cases, the court
approached its task as a balancing of conflicting constitutional
rights.135  The Massachusetts and New Jersey courts, on the other
124. J.B., 751 A.2d at 619.
125. J.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *10.
126. J.B., 751 A.2d at 620; J.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *9.
127. J.B., 751 A.2d at 619; J.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *9.
128. J.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *9.
129. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
130. See text accompanying notes 44–46.
131. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600.
132. Id. at 598.
133. Id. at 598–99.
134. Id. at 601.
135. Id. at 603.
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hand, approached the issue as a matter of public policy, not of consti-
tutional rights.136
In Davis, the court considered the couple’s particular circum-
stances and decided that the strong negative emotional consequences
to Junior Davis from unwanted parenthood outweighed his ex-wife’s
interests.137  A significant element in the case was that his ex-wife, who
had remarried, intended to donate the pre-embryos to another couple
rather than use them herself.  Junior Davis had had an unhappy
childhood and lived in a home for boys after his parents divorced.  He
saw his father only three times after the divorce.138  Had the former
Ms. Davis donated the embryos, Junior Davis would have been
forced to be the biological father of a child against his will and then to
re-live his childhood traumas by losing all contact with his biological
child.  The court conceded that the case would have been more diffi-
cult if the ex-wife intended to use the pre-embryos herself and could
not have achieved parenthood—that is, biological parenthood—any
other way.139  The court explained it would “ordinarily” rule for the
party seeking to avoid procreation, but only “assuming that the other
party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than the pre-embryos in question.”140  The case has been de-
scribed as deciding that if the couple had no prior agreement for dis-
posing of the embryos, the party that wants to destroy the embryos
will prevail, unless the other party wants to implant the embryos and
has no other way to reproduce.141
The situation was similar in J.B., the New Jersey case.142  The ex-
wife, who already had children, would have become a biological par-
ent to a child her ex-husband wanted to donate to another couple,
losing all parental rights to that child.143  Moreover, her ex-husband
136. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 619 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).  The New Jersey Supreme Court referred to United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and its own decisions, involving the constitutional right of privacy as “a
framework” for disputes over pre-embryos.  J.B. v. M.B., 2001 WL 909294, at *8 (N.J. Aug. 14,
2001).
137. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Tenn. 1992).
138. Id. at 603–04.
139. Id. at 604.
140. Id.
141. See John A. Robertson, Meaning What You Sign, 28 HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug.
1998, at 22; see also Schonfeld, supra note 96, at 325.  It is not certain, however, whether the
court would enforce that exception if the couple had a prior agreement to destroy the pre-
embryos.
142. J.B. v. M.B., 51 A.2d 613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
143. Id. at 620.
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was already a father and was able to father children with another
woman.  Thus, he would not have been denied the right to procreate
generally, only the more specific right to procreate from his ex-wife’s
fertilized eggs.144  In A.Z., the Massachusetts court took account only
of the ex-husband’s right not to be compelled to become a parent
over his later objection.145  It did not discuss his ex-wife’s right to be a
parent, perhaps because she already had two children.
These decisions manifest the deep importance that individuals
and courts attach to the genetic connection between parent and child.
Although reproductive technologies have been described as separat-
ing reproduction from sex, at least in the context of IVF and frozen
pre-embryos, they have not diminished the importance of genetic
parenthood by separating parenting from biology.146  Indeed, couples
undergo the invasive IVF procedures for the purpose of having their
own biological children rather than adopting a child at the outset.147
IV.  THE BIOLOGICAL TIE
Feminists have criticized those who would determine parenthood
by genetic connection alone because they impose a male model of
parenthood and ignore the unique female contribution of gestation
and childbirth.148  However, the controversy between the relative im-
portance of genetics and gestation is not involved in these claims of
divorced spouses to their pre-embryos.  The disputes discussed in this
Article do not involve conflicting parental claims by more than the
two parties to a child already born.  Instead, these disputes involve a
couple’s conflicting claims to establish or avoid a future parental con-
nection to a child genetically their own and the importance of that
biological connection in relation to the parties’ pre-conception
agreements.  In these cases, the courts use genetics both in the posi-
tive sense of a person’s interest in becoming a biological parent, and
144. Id. at 619.
145. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000).
146. See, e.g., Shapo supra note 1, at 1093; Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Redefining Parenthood,
29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 313, 314 (1999).
147. Susan Alexander, A Fairer Hand: Why Courts Must Recognize the Value of a Child’s
Companionship, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 273, 320–21 (1991) (discussing why couples undergo
the stressful IVF procedures in order to have a child) and 274–78 (discussing the importance to
parents, especially women, of a child’s companionship).
148. See, e.g., Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 146, at 322; Capron, supra note 86, at 23; Shapo,
supra note 1, at 1166.
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in the negative sense of an interest in not becoming a biological par-
ent.149
In Nachmani, the Israeli court awarded the pre-embryos to Ms.
Nachmani so that she could have a child genetically her own.150  In-
deed, the court did not consider the alternative that Ms. Nachmani
could adopt.151  The Tennessee,152 Massachusetts,153 and New Jersey
courts,154 by comparison, awarded the pre-embryos to parties who
would destroy the pre-embryos so that they would not be forced into
genetic parenthood of a child raised by their ex-spouse, or donated to
strangers.  Yet, in the Massachusetts and New Jersey cases, the party
wanting the pre-embryos for implantation already had a child or chil-
dren.155  In the Tennessee and New Jersey cases, the courts empha-
sized that they might not have ordered the pre-embryos destroyed if
the party requesting custody wanted to bring the pre-embryos to term
to raise themselves, and this was the party’s only chance for genetic
children.156
Only the New York court decided on contractual grounds
alone;157 it did not consider that Ms. Kass was childless and, like Ruthi
Nachmani, would not be able to have a biological child in the future
without the pre-embryos.  Moreover, the New York court never dis-
cussed the divorced couple’s conflicting interests in parenthood.  If
the court had been concerned about Ms. Kass raising the child as a
single parent or her ability to take responsibility for the child—that is,
if the court was inquiring into the best interests of the child—it did
not mention those concerns in its decision.
Two other recent decisions involving slightly different issues em-
phasize other courts’ concern with the importance of biology and the
right to procreate rather than with contract and pre-conception intent
to determine parenthood.158  In both of these cases, the couple already
had one or more children.  In one case, only one member of a di-
149. See Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 146, at 322.
150. Id. at 317–18 (citing F.H. 2401/95, Nachmani II, 50(4) P.D. 661).
151. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 146, at 323.
152. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1991).
153. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000).
154. J.B. v. M.B., 51 A.2d 613, 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
155. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1052; J.B., 751 A.2d at 615.
156. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
157. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178–82. (N.Y.  1998).
158. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. 2000); In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.
App. 1999).
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vorced couple had provided the gametes for frozen pre-embryos.159  In
the other case, a child was born after the couple divorced, but was
conceived by IVF during their marriage.160
In Litowitz, a Washington court held that an ex-husband alone
had an interest in pre-embryos conceived by IVF from the husband’s
sperm and a donor’s eggs.161  Ms. Litowitz, who had four children, two
of them from the marriage to Mr. Litowitz, wanted custody of the re-
maining pre-embryos.  The parties’ consent form with the IVF clinic
did not specify the fate of the pre-embryos if the parties divorced, and
although Ms. Litowitz argued that the couple had an implied agree-
ment to give her custody of the pre-embryos to arrange for their
birth, the court would not imply an agreement between them to par-
ent a child after divorce.162  Ms. Litowitz also argued that she had a
right to the pre-embryos as their “intended parent.”163  The court did
not even discuss this contention and never considered her interest in
obtaining the pre-embryos.  Because Ms. Litowitz had no genetic
connection to the pre-embryos, and thus to any child that would be
born from them, the court determined that she had no “constitutional
right” to procreate.164  In the court’s view, the husband alone, as the
genetic progenitor, had the “right to dispose of the pre-embryos as he
chooses.”165  Thus, the court awarded the pre-embryos to the husband,
based on his “right not to procreate,”166 even though he planned to
donate them to an out-of-state couple and would be the genetic par-
ent of a child he would not know.167
The second case in which biology proved paramount involved a
Texas couple.  In O.G.M., a Texas court determined the parentage of
a child conceived by IVF during the couple’s marriage, but carried to
159. Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1088.
160. O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d at 974.
161. Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1088.
162. Id. at 1091.
163. Id. at 1090.
164. Id. at 1092.
165. Id. at 1093.
166. Id.
167. This decision impliedly distinguished social from biological parents.  According to the
court, the psychological and financial aspects of parenting flow from long-term obligations, not
from the brief act of conception, so that Mr. Litowitz would not become a parent against his
will.  Id.  Mr. Litowitz’s genetic tie endowed him as the biological parent and the sole decision-
maker, but not necessarily as the child’s social parent.  In Davis, however, Junior Davis had ar-
gued convincingly that he did not want his ex-wife to give the pre-embryos to another couple
because he then would be a parent to the children, but would not know them.  Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 603-4 (Tenn. 1991).
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term and born after their divorce.168  The couple disagreed as to
whether, before they began IVF treatments, they had agreed that the
husband would have paternity rights after the child was born.169  The
court, however, decided that the ex-husband was the child’s legal fa-
ther, not on the basis of whether the couple had agreed or not, but
because of the ex-husband’s biological paternity and his conduct after
the child’s conception.170  The ex-wife argued that in prior cases of as-
sisted conception all courts had determined parenthood by the par-
ties’ intent.171  The court, however, distinguished cases in which the
courts had based parenthood on the parties’ pre-conception intent,
and did not consider that factor sufficient to overcome the husband’s
biological paternity.172  Moreover, the court noted that those cases did
not involve determination of parenthood of a child conceived by IVF
during marriage, but born after the parties divorced.173
Thus, most American courts have relied on biology and not con-
tract or intent in order to locate decision-making authority over pre-
embryos.  However, the courts have used biology in the negative
sense by favoring individual autonomy and the right not to procreate
over parental ties—the courts have favored the party who did not
want to become the parent of a child born from pre-embryos con-
ceived before the parties divorced.
In these difficult situations, American courts appear to be
searching, unsuccessfully so far, for persuasive precedents and analo-
gies.  The courts have thus far rejected the analogy between frozen
pre-embryos and in vivo pregnancy.  Instead, the New York Court of
Appeals relied on contract principles to bind a couple to their pre-
conception contractual intent.174  But the precedents for parenthood
by contract have been cases that involve distinguishable issues.  The
Massachusetts and New Jersey courts have rejected the New York
contractual approach and have decided that, as a matter of public
168. In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473, 474–75 (Tex. App. 1999).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 478.
171. Id. at 477.
172. Id. at 478.  The cases the court distinguished involved either the parties’ agreement
about paternity of a child born by AID to an unmarried woman using a known donor’s sperm,
In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989), or the maternity of a child gestated by a married woman,
but conceived from donated ova and the husband’s sperm, McDonald v. McDonald, 608
N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994), or the opposite situation in Johnson, the maternity of a child born to a sur-
rogate, but conceived of the married couple’s gametes, Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 776
(Cal. 1993) (en banc).
173. O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d at 478.
174. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180–81(N.Y.  1998).
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policy, they will not force one of the progenitors into parenthood.175
However, the body of law on which these courts relied involved stat-
utes and cases that allow genetic parents and surrogates to change
their minds and not give up a child for adoption even after the child
has been born.176  Indeed, these cases and statutes show the compel-
ling pull of biological parenthood; they allow the biological parent to
reconsider and to keep the child over the claims of contracting par-
ties.  The existing law on which these courts relied also involves more
than two people who claim parenthood to the same child (the genetic
parents and the potential adopters, or the surrogate and the commis-
sioning couple).  Thus, these cases do not provide a strong basis for
the courts’ decisions in favor of the party wishing to avoid parent-
hood.
V.  UNITED KINGDOM LAW
The United Kingdom law regulating ART has been described as
emphasizing the genetic nature of parenthood.177  In 1990, the U.K.
enacted comprehensive legislation, the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act (HFEA).178  The HFEA itself does not expressly cover
the fate of unused frozen pre-embryos where the couple does not
agree.  Under the HFEA, however, unused frozen embryos will be
destroyed after five years179 unless both the “mother” and “father”
consent to continue storage.180
Under Schedule 3 of the HFEA, the parties must consent in
writing to the use or storage of their embryos and must “be given a
suitable opportunity to receive proper counseling about the implica-
tions of taking the proposed steps.”181  The Schedule permits the par-
175. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 51 A.2d 613, 620 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
176. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059; J.B., 751 A.2d at 620.
177. Martin Johnson, A Biomedical Perspective on Parenthood, in WHAT IS A PARENT? 47,
64 (Andrew Bainham et al. eds., 1999).  Professor Johnson was a member of the Human Fertili-
sation and Embryology Authority.
178. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.) [hereinafter HFEA].
The HFEA recognizes a surrogate as the mother of the child she bears regardless of her genetic
tie, and recognizes the husband of a woman who bears a child from AID as the father.  Profes-
sor Johnson, however, explains the latter rule as designed to protect the genetic father, and the
former rule as designed to discourage the use of surrogates because the commissioning couple
loses control of their genetic material.  Johnson, supra note 177, at 65–66.
179. HFEA § 14.
180. Id. § 2.
181. HFEA Schedule 3(3)(4)(a).
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ties to vary or withdraw their consent, but both must agree.182  Ac-
cording to the current chair of the Human Fertilisation and Embryol-
ogy Authority,183 “[the] British attitude is very insistent on consent as
the key to dignified and independent use of a person’s genetic mate-
rial.  The preservation of bodily integrity and control over one’s own
genetic material is paramount.”184  The result of one party having such
control, however, is that the other party loses autonomy and control.
If one party refuses to consent to use of the frozen embryo for im-
plantation and prevents the other party from implanting the embryo
and bearing the child, the latter party loses control over her genetic
material.  If the parties reach a stalemate, the embryo will be de-
stroyed after the statutory maximum storage time without either
party’s consent.
At least one commentator has criticized the HFEA’s require-
ment of dual consent,185 recognizing that in the “turbulent emotional
conditions of divorce,”186 the parties will not always agree.  Contrast-
ing the husband’s increased decision-making rights over the frozen
pre-embryo under the HFEA to his lack of rights over the fate of an
implanted fetus, the author concludes that it is “both logical and
pragmatically desirable to vest the ultimate disposal of an embryo in
the person for whom it was intended: that is, the woman who was to-
carry it.”187  The author would limit the husband’s consent to the
original conception of the embryo and to its implantation in a woman
other than his wife.188
A new potential weapon against the HFEA’s consent require-
ment is the Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA) which came into force
in October 2000.189  The HRA incorporates into U.K. law the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms and provides that those rights are now directly enforce-
182. Id.
183. The HFEA established the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority as an en-
forcement agent.  HFEA § 41.
184. Ruth Deech, The Legal Regulation of Infertility Treatment in Britain, in CROSS
CURRENTS 165, 175 (Sanford W. Katz et al. eds., 2000).
185. MASON,  supra note 122, at 236.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.  It has also been pointed out that, under the HFEA, if an embryo is recovered by
lavage, that is, it is extracted from a woman’s uterus, the woman alone has the power to consent
to its use.  DEREK MORGAN & ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT 1990 138 (1991).
189. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
SHAPO_FMT.DOC 01/24/02  9:42 AM
100 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:75
able in U.K. courts.190  Specifically, Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion, concerning respect for an individual’s private and family life,191
must now be considered in HFEA litigation.  Thus, in the U.K., a per-
son asking for custody of frozen embryos in order to bring them to
term may claim that the HFEA is not compatible with Article 8’s
right to family life.  However, the Article 8 right is not absolute.  A
public authority may interfere with this right by a decision “pre-
scribed by law,” that has a legitimate aim, and is “no more than is
necessary in a democratic society” (i.e., it is proportional).192
The English courts will have to interpret and reconcile a complex
mixture of European and domestic law.  It would appear, though, that
in a suit by one progenitor to obtain frozen pre-embryos where the
parties had previously agreed to their destruction, one party may ar-
gue that she has a right to a family through implantation of the pre-
embryos.  By contrast, the non-consenting party may claim that to be-
come a parent against his or her consent violates Article 8’s right to
privacy.  Article 8 analysis will then involve a “proportionality” in-
quiry or “doing no more than is necessary in order to achieve a par-
ticular end which is itself lawful and necessary.”193  The court will then
have to balance the parties’ conflicting rights.
The discussions in the diverse and interesting cases litigated in-
volving the Human Rights Act, which have required the English
courts to balance opposing rights, provide some guidance.  An exam-
ple, somewhat far afield, involves the actors Michael Douglas and
Catherine Zeta-Jones.  Having sold exclusive rights to photograph
their marriage ceremony to one magazine, they sought an injunction
against another magazine to prevent the publication of photos it had
obtained from an unknown source.194  The court viewed the case as a
conflict between the European Convention’s Article 10 right to free
expression and Article 8 right to respect for privacy and family life.195
The court said that neither article had presumptive priority over the
190. PAUL ASHCROFT ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COURTS 9 (Bryan Gibson ed.,
1999).
191. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
192.  ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 190, at 27.
193. Id. at 26–27.
194. Douglas and Others v. Hello! Ltd., [2001] H.R.L.R. 26 (Eng. C.A.).
195. The Court of Appeals recognized a right of personal privacy in English law, which had
not been clearly recognized before.  See Nicole Moreham, Douglas and Others v. Hello! Ltd.—
The Protection of Privacy in English Private Law, 64 MOD. L. REV. 767, 767 (2001).
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other, but that each was subject to a rule of proportionality.196  Be-
cause the couple had not had a private wedding and had sold their
privacy, the court denied the injunction.
Re A,197 a case decided just days before the HRA came into force,
involved conflicting interests where an infant’s life was at stake.  In-
fant twins had been born conjoined.  Their parents would not con-
sent, on religious grounds, to a surgical separation that would save the
life of one of the twins, but kill the other.  Without the operation both
twins would have died.  The weaker twin depended for life on the
other and the stronger twin, unable to sustain both their lives, would
have died of heart failure within three to six months.198  The court bal-
anced both children’s interests and ordered the separation operation
without parental consent in order to save one child’s life, viewing the
decision as “the least detrimental choice,”199 although it would hasten
the death of the other child.  Looking to the European Convention’s
Article 2(1) provision on protection of life,200 the court noted that had
the HRA, and thus Article 2(1), been in force, it would have been re-
quired to balance its negative obligation to refrain from intentional
deprivation of life and its positive obligation to protect the enjoyment
of life.201  The court chose its positive obligation to save a life.
Closer to the topic of ART is a recent case involving ART
through artificial insemination, where the court decided against al-
lowing a prisoner to provide sperm to inseminate his wife.202  The
prisoner relied on the Article 8 right to respect for private and family
life.  The court, however, said that imprisonment was “inconsistent
with those rights”203 because family life was incompatible with the
purposes of imprisonment.  The court did note that in exceptional cir-
cumstances where deprivation would be disproportionate to the aim
of imprisonment, the prison authorities had allowed artificial insemi-
196. Douglas, [2001] H.R.L.R. 26, at ¶ 50.
197. 1 Fam. 1 (Eng. C.A. 2001).
198. Id. at 15.
199. Id. at 62.
200. Article 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) provides, “Every-
one’s right to life shall be protected by law. . . .”  European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 191, at art. 2(1).
201. Re A, 1 Fam. at 1.
202. Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept. ex parte Mellor, [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 472
(Eng. C.A., Apr. 4, 2001), available at http://www.markwalton.net/2001/civil_mellor.asp? (last
visited Nov. 20, 2001).
203. Id.
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nation.204  Possibly, one of those circumstances could involve a situa-
tion in which the parties would no longer be able to reproduce after
the prisoner had served his sentence.
In the background of this relatively undeveloped case law, the
outcome of a dispute over frozen pre-embryos under U.K. law is un-
certain.  In HFEA litigation, a court must now consider the HRA and
its attendant balancing of rights.  One party’s privacy right not to be a
parent presumably would have no priority over the other party’s right
to become a parent and bring an embryo to life.  A court will balance
each party’s interests, taking account of their individual circum-
stances.205  In at least one case, an English court, acting without the
parents’ consent, chose a child’s life.206
VI.  CONCLUSION
The Israeli Supreme Court in Nachmani staked out a different,
arguably wiser, position than that adopted thus far by courts in the
United States or embodied in U.K. legislation.  Recognizing that
there was no existing law on point, the majority in Nachmani ap-
proached the case in significant measure as a matter of expectations
and justice.  The majority in Nachmani viewed justice as requiring a
decision that favors life; therefore the court permitted an attempt to
vivify frozen embryos for a woman who had no other chance for ge-
netic children.  No American case except Kass has addressed a situa-
tion in which the last opportunity for genetic children was at stake.  In
Kass, the court’s framing of the issue precluded the judges from con-
sidering it.207  Yet, that circumstance has been recognized in two
American cases208 as a potentially decisive factor, and an English court
has recognized the importance of protecting an infant’s life even
without parental consent.209
The American cases, although seemingly unanimous in outcome
are, in fact, contradictory.  The courts have disagreed about whether a
couple is bound by the informed consent forms they signed with the
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Guidera’s Estate, Bingham v. Guidera, 3 BUTTERWORTHS INT’L TRUST &
ESTATE L. RPTR. 397 (N. Ir., Nov. 24, 2000).
206. Re A, 1 Fam. at 62.
207. See generally Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
208. J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000), aff’d in part, 2001 WL
909294 (N.J. Aug. 14, 2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1991).
209. Re A, 1 Fam. 1 (Eng. C.A. 2001).
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IVF facility.210  Courts have also differed as to whether to impose a
fixed rule that a person will not be forced to become a parent after he
or she changes his or her mind about implanting frozen pre-embryos,
or whether to balance the rights of each of the divorced persons, tak-
ing into account their individual circumstances.211  Courts have also
differed as to the relevance of whether the parties are already parents
or may be able to become parents with another partner.
It appears that courts will continue to walk an uncertain path
without adequate analogies through the complex problems created by
biology, technology, and human emotions.  Although contract law
seems to provide a bright-line solution, couples who embark on ART
face special anti-contractual pressures.  The usual premises of bar-
gaining, efficiency, and rationality generally do not hold for people
embarking on a program of IVF.  Courts would do well to take ac-
count of specific facts, especially whether one or both of the parties
already has biological children or would be able to have them in the
future, as well as taking into account more general public policy con-
siderations.  And courts should ensure that any public policy they in-
voke takes into account the particular issues raised by a divorced
couple’s disagreement over their frozen pre-embryos.  Individual
autonomy works both ways.  One party’s holdout “right” not to be a
parent and to dispose of pre-embryos becomes a veto—and perhaps a
bargaining chip in divorce—over the other party’s “right” to be a par-
ent.  One can only predict that courts will continue to search for a
more coherent and equitable theory for some years to come.
210. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B., 751 A.2d 613; Kass, 696 N.E.2d
174.
211. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051; J.B., 751 A.2d 613; Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
